Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41 (2012)
There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic—and, I shall argue, false—crowding consequence
|Keywords||Bare particulars Thin particulars Substratum Bundle theory|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
Tropes as Character-Grounders.Robert K. Garcia - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):499-515.
Similar books and articles
Bare Particulars and Individuation Reply to Mertz.J. P. Moreland & Timothy Pickavance - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):1 – 13.
'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars Exposed.Richard Brian Davis - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):534 – 548.
Substrata and Properties: From Bare Particulars to Supersubstantivalism?Matteo Morganti - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (2):183-195.
Against Zero-Dimensional Material Objects (and Other Bare Particulars).Daniel Giberman - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):305-321.
In Defence of 'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars.Timothy Pickavance - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):155 – 158.
Particulars, Positional Qualities, and Individuation.L. Nathan Oaklander - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (3):478-490.
Added to index2010-11-18
Total downloads349 ( #7,608 of 2,154,061 )
Recent downloads (6 months)23 ( #16,083 of 2,154,061 )
How can I increase my downloads?