Personal identity and mental content

Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):323-33 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I attempt to map out the 'logical geography' of the territory in which issues of mental content and of personal identity meet. In particular, I investigate the possibility of combining a psychological criterion of personal identity with an externalist theory of content. I argue that this can be done, but only by accepting an assumption that has been widely accepted but barely argued for, namely that when someone switches linguistic communities, the contents of their thoughts do not change immediately, but only after the person becomes integrated within the new linguistic community. I also suggest that recent work on personal identity, notably by Derek Parfit, has tacitly assumed internalism regarding mental content. I do not intend to argue for either externalism or a psychological criterion. My aim is merely to explicate the issues involved in making them compatible.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,442

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
230 (#54,786)

6 months
2 (#301,800)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

James Baillie
University of Portland

Citations of this work

Memory and Externalism.Sven Bernecker - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605-632.
A Defense of Presentist Externalism.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2):259-274.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Sameness and Substance.David Wiggins - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Individualism and self-knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.

View all 8 references / Add more references