Qualia and the argument from illusion: A defence of figment [Book Review]

Acta Analytica 22 (2):85-103 (2007)
Abstract
This paper resurrects two discredited ideas in the philosophy of mind. The first: the idea that perceptual illusion might have something metaphysically significant to tell us about the nature of phenomenal consciousness. The second: that the colours and other qualities that ‘fill’ our sensory fields are occurrent properties (rather than representations of properties) that are, nevertheless, to be distinguished from the ‘objective’ properties of things in the external world. Theories of consciousness must recognize the existence of what Daniel Dennett mockingly labels ‘figment,’ but this result—though metaphysically and epistemologically significant—is not incompatible with either physicalism or naturalized semantics.
Keywords Transparency  Representationalism  Intentionalism  Consciousness  Physicalism  Qualia  Illusion
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-007-0002-0
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