The Imperative View of Pain

Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85 (2011)
Authors
David Bain
Glasgow University
Abstract
Pain, crucially, is unpleasant and motivational. It can be awful; and it drives us to action, e.g. to take our weight off a sprained ankle. But what is the relationship between pain and those two features? And in virtue of what does pain have them? Addressing these questions, Colin Klein and Richard J. Hall have recently developed the idea that pains are, at least partly, experiential commands—to stop placing your weight on your ankle, for example. In this paper, I reject their accounts. Against Klein, I use dissociation cases to argue that possession of ‘imperative content’ cannot wholly constitute pain. Against them both, I further claim that possession of such content cannot even constitute pain’s unpleasant, motivational aspect. For, even if it were possible to specify the relevant imperative content—which is far from clear—the idea of a command cannot bear the explanatory weight Klein and Hall place on it.
Keywords Pain  Imperatives  Perceptualism  Klein  Hall
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What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Pains as Reasons.Manolo Martínez - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2261-2274.
The Inadequacy of Unitary Characterizations of Pain.Jennifer Corns - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):355-378.

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