You Needn't Be Simple

Philosophical Papers 43 (2):145-160 (2014)

Authors
Andrew M. Bailey
Yale-NUS College
Abstract
Here's an interesting question: what are we? David Barnett has claimed that reflection on consciousness suggests an answer: we are simple. Barnett argues that the mereological simplicity of conscious beings best explains the Datum: that no pair of persons can itself be conscious. In this paper, I offer two alternative explanations of the Datum. If either is correct, Barnett's argument fails. First, there aren't any such things as pairs of persons. Second, consciousness is maximal; no conscious thing is a proper part of another conscious thing. I conclude by showing how both moves comport with materialist theories of what we are and then apply them to another anti-materialist argument.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/05568641.2014.932955
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 46,483
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Against Parthood.Theodore Sider - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:237–293.
Material Beings.Peter VAN INWAGEN - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
What Are We?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.
What We Disagree About When We Disagree About Ontology.Cian Dorr - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 234--86.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Material Through and Through.Andrew M. Bailey - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Maximality, Function, and the Many.Robert Francescotti - 2019 - Metaphysica 20 (2):175-193.
Resisting the Remnant-Person Problem.Eric Yang - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-16.
Persons, Simplicity, and Substance.Eric Yang - 2018 - Philosophical Papers 47 (2):299-311.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

You Are Simple.David Barnett - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 161--174.
Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.
Against the Maximality Principle.C. S. Sutton - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (2):381-390.
When is Perception Conscious?Jesse J. Prinz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 310--332.
Concerning the Unity of Consciousness.William Hasker - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):532-547.
Consciousness, Agents and the Knowledge Game.Luciano Floridi - 2005 - Minds and Machines 15 (3):415-444.
The Nature of People.Eric T. Olson - 2014 - In S. Luper (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death. Cambridge University Press. pp. 30-46.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-06-22

Total views
1,014 ( #2,889 of 2,286,467 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
184 ( #2,589 of 2,286,467 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature