Philosophical Studies 154 (2):185 - 204 (2011)
How should we count people who have two cerebral hemispheres that cooperate to support one mental life at the level required for personhood even though each hemisphere can be disconnected from the other and support its "own" divergent mental life at that level? On the standard method of counting people, there is only one person sitting in your chair and thinking your thoughts even if you have two cerebral hemispheres of this kind. Is this method accurate? In this paper, I argue that it is not, and I advocate an alternative I call the Multiple Person View
|Keywords||Metaphysics Personal identity Cerebral hemispheres Division Animalism|
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References found in this work BETA
The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Singular Thought: Object‐Files, Person‐Files, and the Sortal PERSON.Michael Murez & Joulia Smortchkova - 2014 - Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (4):632-646.
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