“Tätigsein und die Erste-Person-Perspektive” (Agency and the first-person perspective)

In Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Was Sind Menschliche Personen? Onto Verlag (2008)

Authors
Lynne Rudder Baker
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Abstract
It is no news that you and I are agents as well as persons. Agency and personhood are surely connected, but it is not obvious just how they are connected. I believe that being a person and being an agent are intimately linked by what I call a ‘first-person perspective’: All persons and all agents have first-person perspectives. Even so, the connection between personhood and agency is not altogether straightforward. There are different kinds of agents, and there are different kinds of first-person perspectives. On the one hand, all persons are agents, but not all agents are persons; on the other hand, all moral agents are persons, but not all persons are moral agents.
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 2003 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Freedom and Action.Roderick Chisholm - 1966 - In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Random House.

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