Attitudes in action: A causal account

Manuscrito 25 (3):47-78 (2002)
Abstract
This article aims to vindicate the commonsensical view that what we think affects what we do. In order to show that mental properties like believing, desiring and intending are causally explanatory, I propose a nonreductive, materialistic account that identifies beliefs and desires by their content, and that shows how differences in the contents of beliefs and desires can make causal differences in what we do.
Keywords Action  Causation  Counterfactual  Metaphysics  Mind  Supervenience
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