Bilattice logic of epistemic actions and knowledge

Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 171 (6):102790 (2020)
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Abstract

Baltag, Moss, and Solecki proposed an expansion of classical modal logic, called logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (EAK), in which one can reason about knowledge and change of knowledge. Kurz and Palmigiano showed how duality theory provides a flexible framework for modeling such epistemic changes, allowing one to develop dynamic epistemic logics on a weaker propositional basis than classical logic (for example an intuitionistic basis). In this paper we show how the techniques of Kurz and Palmigiano can be further extended to define and axiomatize a bilattice logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (BEAK). Our propositional basis is a modal expansion of the well-known four-valued logic of Belnap and Dunn, which is a system designed for handling inconsistent as well as potentially conflicting information. These features, we believe, make our framework particularly promising from a computer science perspective.

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Umberto Rivieccio
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

Citations of this work

A Four-Valued Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Yuri David Santos - 2020 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (4):451-489.

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References found in this work

Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning.Ronald Fagin & Joseph Y. Halpern - 1987 - Artificial Intelligence 34 (1):39-76.
Reasoning about information change.Jelle Gerbrandy & Willem Groeneveld - 1997 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (2):147-169.
Reasoning with logical bilattices.Ofer Arieli & Arnon Avron - 1996 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 5 (1):25--63.

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