Defeatism Defeated

Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66 (2015)

Authors
Matthew A. Benton
Seattle Pacific University
Max Baker-Hytch
Oxford University (DPhil)
Abstract
Many epistemologists are enamored with a defeat condition on knowledge. In this paper we present some implementation problems for defeatism, understood along either internalist or externalist lines. We then propose that one who accepts a knowledge norm of belief, according to which one ought to believe only what one knows, can explain away much of the motivation for defeatism. This is an important result, because on the one hand it respects the plausibility of the intuitions about defeat shared by many in epistemology; but on the other hand, it obviates the need to provide a unified account of defeat which plays well with the most plausible views of how knowledge fits with evidential probability.
Keywords epistemic defeat  defeaters  knowledge  evidence  evidential probability  knowledge norm of belief  E=K
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DOI 10.1111/phpe.12056
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References found in this work BETA

Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 120-133.

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Citations of this work BETA

How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):251-275.
Evil and Evidence.Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 7:1-31.
Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.

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