Authors
Derek Baker
Lingnan University
Abstract
This paper argues that, with certain provisos, predicting one's future actions is incompatible with rationally deliberating about whether to perform those actions. It follows that fully rational omniscient agents are impossible, since an omniscient being could never rationally deliberate about what to do. Consequently, theories that explain practical reasons in terms of the choices of a perfectly rational omniscient agent must fail. The paper considers several ways of defending the possibility of an omniscient agent, and concludes that while some of these may work, they are inconsistent with the aim of explaining practical normativity by appeal to such an agent.
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Reprint years 2015, 2016
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12199
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas M. Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
The Moral Problem.James Lenman - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.
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Deliberation and Acting for Reasons.N. Arpaly & T. Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):209-239.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deliberators Must Be Imperfect.Derek Clayton Baker - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):321-347.
Transformative Choice, Practical Reasons and Trust.Rob Compaijen - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2):275-292.

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