How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency

Ethics 125 (2):391-424 (2015)

Authors
Derek Baker
Lingnan University
Jack Woods
University of Leeds
Abstract
Mark Schroeder has argued that all reasonable forms of inconsistency of attitude consist of having the same attitude type towards a pair of inconsistent contents (A-type inconsistency). We suggest that he is mistaken in this, offering a number of intuitive examples of pairs of distinct attitudes types with consistent contents which are intuitively inconsistent (B-type inconsistency). We further argue that, despite the virtues of Schroeder's elegant A-type expressivist semantics, B-type inconsistency is in many ways the more natural choice in developing an expressivist account of moral discourse. We close by showing how to adapt ordinary formality-based accounts of logicality to define a B-type account of logical inconsistency and distinguish it from both semantic and pragmatic inconsistency. In sum, we provide a roadmap of how to develop a successful B-type expressivism.
Keywords Expressivism  Frege-Geach Problem  Inconsistency  B-type Inconsistency  Being For
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1086/678371
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References found in this work BETA

Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Frege-Geach Problem.Jack Woods - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 226-242.
Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology.Benjamin Lennertz - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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