Human Persons as Social Entities

Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):77-87 (2015)
Authors
Lynne Baker
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Abstract
The aim of this article is to show that human persons belong, ontologically, in social ontology. After setting out my views on ontology, I turn to persons and argue that they have first-person perspectives in two stages (rudimentary and robust) essentially. Then I argue that the robust stage of the first-person persective is social, in that it requires a language, and languages require linguistic communities. Then I extend the argument to cover the rudimentary stage of the first-person perspective as well. I conclude by enumerating ways in which human persons differ from nonhuman animals.
Keywords First-Person Perspective  Social Beings
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1515/jso-2014-0037
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,167
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (3):333-348.
Persons and Other Things.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):5-6.
The Second-Person Perspective.Michael Pauen - 2012 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):33 - 49.
Response to Dr. Gallup on Animal Rights.John Crosby - 1986 - Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):113-113.
Many Minds, No Persons.W. R. Carter - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):55-70.
First-Personal Aspects of Agency.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):1-16.
Animalism and Person Essentialism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2015 - Metaphysica 16 (1):53-72.
On Becoming a Person.John Barresi - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):79-98.
The Phenomenology and Development of Social Perspectives.Thomas Fuchs - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):655-683.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-04-15

Total downloads
39 ( #153,565 of 2,242,253 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #112,107 of 2,242,253 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature