Self-directed and self-evaluative attitudes are often connected to one’s social position. Before investigating the dependence relations between individual self-evaluation and social positioning, however, there is a prior question to answer: What are the conditions under which an individual can have any self-directed attitudes at all? In order to be the subject of self-directed or selfevaluative attitudes, I shall argue, an individual must have linguistic and social relations. I’ll discuss the first-person perspective, self-concepts and their acquisition—all from a radically nonCartesian, externalist point of view. This paper will combine my work on first-person perspectives with my work on “content externalism” in the philosophy of mind in order to understand how someone can have self-directed attitudes at all. Having self-directed attitudes—attitudes about oneself—is a precondition for making any individual self-evaluation. Self-directed attitudes and self-evaluative attitudes—such as self-love, self-esteem and self-loathing—“are [in the words of our organizers] often closely tied to the position one occupies within a network of social relations.”1 Quite so. But before investigating the particular dependence relations between individual self-evaluation and social positioning, there is a prior question to answer: What are the conditions under which an individual can have any self-directed attitudes at all? That is the question that I want to address here. Then, I want to draw a moral about what it is to be a human person. In order to be the subject of self-directed or self-evaluative attitudes, I shall argue, an individual must have linguistic and social relations. Some self-directed attitudes obviously require the subject to have linguistic and social relations. For example, pride in one’s class rank requires comparison between oneself and others (as well as having the concept *class rank*.) By contrast, other attitudes of self-satisfaction (such as one’s self-satisfaction in sticking to a healthful diet) do not obviously require one to have linguistic and social relations..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Assessment of Attitudes Toward Corporate Social Accountability in Britain.Vassilios P. Filios - 1985 - Journal of Business Ethics 4 (3):155 - 173.
Globalist Attitudes and the Fittingness Objection.Macalester Bell - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):449-472.
Propositions, What Are They Good For?Stephen Schiffer - 2012 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning (Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy, Vol. 3). Walter de Gruyter.
Not All Attitudes Are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.
Neosentimentalism and the Valence of Attitudes.Katie McShane - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):747-765.
There is No Such Thing as Environmental Ethics.P. Aarne Vesilind - 1996 - Science and Engineering Ethics 2 (3):307-318.
Three Kinds of Social Kinds.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):96-112.
Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, the Evaluative Attitudes, and Type Correspondence Between Mind and Brain.JP Sevilla - manuscript
The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution.J. Matthews Robert - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Social Investment: Subjectivism, Sublation and the Moral Elevation of Success.Matthew Haigh - unknown
Beyond the Individual: Sources of Attitudes Towards Rule Violation in Sport.Ashkan Atry, Mats G. Hansson & Ulrik Kihlbom - 2012 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 6 (4):467-479.
Added to index2011-05-18
Total downloads89 ( #59,055 of 2,177,974 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #317,205 of 2,177,974 )
How can I increase my downloads?