In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Ontos Verlag. pp. 203-226 (2007)

Authors
Lynne Rudder Baker
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Abstract
The first-person perspective is a challenge to naturalism. Naturalistic theories are relentlessly third-personal. The first-person perspective is, well, first-personal; it is the perspective from which one thinks of oneself as oneself* without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or other referential device. The exercise of the capacity to think of oneself in this first-personal way is the necessary condition of all our self-knowledge, indeed of all our self-consciousness. As important as the first-person perspective is, many philosophers have not appreciated the force of the data from the first-person perspective, and suppose that the first-person perspective presents no particular problems for the naturalizing philosopher. For example, Ned Block commented, “It is of course [phenomenal] consciousness rather than...self-consciousness that has seemed such a scientific mystery.” And David Chalmers says that self-consciousness is one of those psychological states that “pose no deep metaphysical enigmas.”
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References found in this work BETA

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
The Refutation of Idealism.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Mind 12 (48):433-453.

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Citations of this work BETA

Human Persons as Social Entities.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):77-87.
Mineness Without Minimal Selves.M. V. P. Slors & F. Jongepier - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):193-219.
A Materialist Criterion of Fundamentality.Javier Cumpa - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (4):319-324.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

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