Propositional learning is a useful research heuristic but it is not a theoretical algorithm

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):199-200 (2009)

Authors
Anna Baker
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
Mitchell et al.'s claim, that their propositional theory is a single-process theory, is illusory because they relegate some learning to a secondary memory process. This renders the single-process theory untestable. The propositional account is not a process theory of learning, but rather, a heuristic that has led to interesting research
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X09000879
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References found in this work BETA

On the Generality of the Laws of Learning.Martin E. Seligman - 1970 - Psychological Review 77 (5):406-418.
From Covariation to Causation: A Causal Power Theory.Patricia W. Cheng - 1997 - Psychological Review 104 (2):367-405.
Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men.Edward C. Tolman - 1948 - Psychological Review 55 (4):189-208.

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