Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):199-200 (2009)
Mitchell et al.'s claim, that their propositional theory is a single-process theory, is illusory because they relegate some learning to a secondary memory process. This renders the single-process theory untestable. The propositional account is not a process theory of learning, but rather, a heuristic that has led to interesting research
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Contingency Awareness in Evaluative Conditioning: A Case for Unaware Affective-Evaluative Learning.Frank Baeyens, Paul Eelen & Omer van den Bergh - 1990 - Cognition and Emotion 4 (1):3-18.
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