Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2313-2333 (2020)

Derek Baker
Lingnan University
I argue that standard explanationist solutions to the problem of creeping minimalism are largely on the right track, but they fail to correctly specify the kind of explanation that is relevant to distinguishing realism from quasirealism. Quasirealism should not be distinguished from realism in terms of the explanations it gives of why a normative judgment—a normative sentence or attitude—has the semantic content that it has. Rather, it should be distinguished in terms of the explanations it offers of what the semantic content of a normative judgment is.
Keywords Quasirealism  Expressivism  Creeping Minimalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2021
DOI 10.1007/s11098-020-01556-2
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Language, Truth and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.

View all 43 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

If You're Quasi-Explaining, You're Quasi-Losing.Derek Baker - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 16. Oxford University Press.
Quasirealism or Minimalism?Lars Binderup - 2003 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 38 (1):65-83.
Truthmaking, Metaethics, and Creeping Minimalism.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):213-232.
Solving the Problem of Creeping Minimalism.Matthew Simpson - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):510-531.
Expressivism and Realist Explanations.Camil Golub - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1385-1409.
Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):334-358.
Creeping Minimalism and Subject Matter.Matthew Simpson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):750-766.
Moral Realism, QuasiRealism, and Skepticism.Terence Cuneo - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 176.
Minimalist Semantics in Meta-Ethical Expressivism.Billy Dunaway - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):351 - 371.
Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):233-255.
Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth.James Dreier - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.


Added to PP index

Total views
231 ( #42,768 of 2,448,687 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
95 ( #6,096 of 2,448,687 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes