Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter


Authors
Derek Baker
Lingnan University
Abstract
There are many different oughts. There is a moral ought, a prudential ought, an epistemic ought, the legal ought, the ought of etiquette, and so on. These oughts can prescribe incompatible actions. What I morally ought to do may be different from what I self-interestedly ought to do. Philosophers have claimed that these conflicts are resolved by an authoritative ought, or by facts about what one ought to do simpliciter or all-things-considered. However, the only coherent notion of an ought simpliciter has preposterous first-order normative commitments. It is more reasonable to reject the ought simpliciter in favor of the form of normative pluralism advocated in (Tiffany 2007).
Keywords ought  all-things-considered ought  varieties of normativity  unity of practical reason  normative pluralism  institutional reasons  normative authority
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References found in this work BETA

.Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Puzzle About Enkratic Reasoning.Jonathan Way - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
The Authority of Formality.Jack Woods - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental.Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (1).

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