The Abductive Case for Humeanism over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire

Authors
Derek Baker
Lingnan University
Abstract
A number of philosophers have offered quasi-perceptual theories of desire, according to which to desire something is roughly to “see” it as having value or providing reasons. These are offered as alternatives to the more traditional Humean Theory of Motivation, which denies that desires have a representational aspect. This paper examines the various considerations offered by advocates to motivate quasi-perceptualism. It argues that Humeanism is in fact able to explain the same data that the quasi-perceptualist can explain, and in one case the Humean explanation is superior. Quasi-perceptual accounts of desire, the paper concludes, are for the most part unmotivated.
Keywords desires  Humean Theory of Motivation  Guise of the Good  Direction of Fit  Phenomenology of Desire  Practical Reason  Self-Control
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.26556/jesp.v8i2.81
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.

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Citations of this work BETA

Why Transparency Undermines Economy.Derek Clayton Baker - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):3037-3050.
Desires Without Guises: Why We Need Not Value What We Want.Sabine Döring & Bahadir Eker - forthcoming - In Julien Deonna & Federico Lauria (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press.
How Verbal Reports of Desire May Mislead.Alex Gregory - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):241-249.

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