The ontology of artifacts

Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):99 – 111 (2004)
Authors
Lynne Rudder Baker
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Abstract
Beginning with Aristotle, philosophers have taken artifacts to be ontologically deficient. This paper proposes a theory of artifacts, according to which artifacts are ontologically on a par with other material objects. I formulate a nonreductive theory that regards artifacts as constituted by - but not identical to - aggregates of particles. After setting out the theory, I rebut a number of arguments that disparage the ontological status of artifacts.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/13869790410001694462
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,829
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Parts of Classes.David Lewis - 1991 - Blackwell.
Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Cornell University Press.
Sameness and Substance Renewed.David Wiggins - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
Fiction and Metaphysics.Amie L. Thomasson - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Metaphysics of Cognitive Artifacts.Richard Heersmink - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):78-93.
Abstract Creationism and Authorial Intention.David Friedell - 2016 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74 (2):129-137.
The Functional Bias of the Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts Program.Krist Vaesen - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):190-197.
The Ontology of Artefacts: The Hard Problem.Wybo Houkes & Anthonie Meijers - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (1):118-131.

View all 26 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
251 ( #19,166 of 2,293,790 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
72 ( #4,655 of 2,293,790 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature