In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 567-581 (2017)

Authors
Derek Baker
Lingnan University
Abstract
This paper discusses varieties of normative phenomena, ranging from morality, to epistemic justification, to the rules of chess. It canvases a number of distinctions among these different normative phenomena. The most significant distinction is between formal and authoritative normativity. The prior is the normativity exhibited by any standard one can meet or fail to meet. The latter is the sort of normativity associated with phenomena like the "all-things-considered" ought. The paper ends with a brief discussion of reasons for skepticism about authoritative normativity.
Keywords normativity  rationality  reasons  epistemic normativity  all-things-considered ought  constitutivism
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Utilitarianism.J. S. Mill - 1861 - Oxford University Press UK.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.

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Citations of this work BETA

Skepticism About Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
The Simple Constitutivist Move.Luca Ferrero - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):146-162.

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