The Varieties of Normativity

In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 567-581 (2017)
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Abstract

This paper discusses varieties of normative phenomena, ranging from morality, to epistemic justification, to the rules of chess. It canvases a number of distinctions among these different normative phenomena. The most significant distinction is between formal and authoritative normativity. The prior is the normativity exhibited by any standard one can meet or fail to meet. The latter is the sort of normativity associated with phenomena like the "all-things-considered" ought. The paper ends with a brief discussion of reasons for skepticism about authoritative normativity.

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Derek Baker
Lingnan University

Citations of this work

Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
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What's in an Aim?Keshav Singh - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17:138-165.
The simple constitutivist move.Luca Ferrero - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):146-162.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Utilitarianism.J. S. Mill - 1861 - Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Roger Crisp.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.

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