When does a person begin?
Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):25-48 (2005)
Abstract
According to the Constitution View of persons, a human person is wholly constituted by (but not identical to) a human organism. This view does justice both to our similarities to other animals and to our uniqueness. As a proponent of the Constitution View, I defend the thesis that the coming-into-existence of a human person is not simply a matter of the coming-into-existence of an organism, even if that organism ultimately comes to constitute a person. Marshalling some support from developmental psychology, I give a broadly materialistic account of the coming-into-existence of a human person. I argue for the metaphysical superiority of the Constitution View to Biological Animalism, Thomistic Animalism, and other forms of Substance Dualism. I conclude by discussing the single implication of the Constitution View for thinking about abortion. Footnotesa Thanks to Gareth Matthews and Catherine E. Rudder for comments. I am also grateful to other contributors to this volume, especially Robert A. Wilson, Marya Schechtman, David Oderberg, Stephen Braude, and John Finnis.Author's Profile
Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst
DOI
10.1017/s0265052505052027
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Author's Profile
Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Citations of this work
Persons and the metaphysics of resurrection.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (3):333-348.
On Hylemorphism and Personal Identity.Patrick Toner - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):454-473.
The Moral Insignificance of Selfâconsciousness.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).