Synthese 192 (9):3037-3050 (2015)

Derek Baker
Lingnan University
Byrne offers a novel interpretation of the idea that the mind is transparent to its possessor, and that one knows one’s own mind by looking out at the world. This paper argues that his attempts to extend this picture of self-knowledge force him to sacrifice the theoretical parsimony he presents as the primary virtue of his account. The paper concludes by discussing two general problems transparency accounts of self-knowledge must address.
Keywords self-knowledge  inference rules  transparency
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0700-x
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowing Why.Ryan Cox - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):177-197.
The Verdictive Organization of Desire.Derek Clayton Baker - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):589-612.

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