In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 292--312 (2009)
This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs is very closely tied up with features of the epistemic access they afford to qualia. When we deploy phenomenal concepts introspectively to some phenomenally conscious experience as it occurs, we are said to be acquainted with our own conscious experiences. Accounts of PCs either have to explain the acquaintance relation, or acquaintance with our phenomenal experiences has to be denied. PCs have received much attention in recent philosophy of mind mainly because they figure in arguments for dualism and in physicalist responses to these arguments. The main topic of this article is to explore different accounts of phenomenal concepts and their role in recent debates over the metaphysical status of phenomenal consciousness.
|Keywords||Consciousness Concepts Introspection Mind-Body Problem|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
On a Confusion About Which Intuitions to Trust: From the Hard Problem to a Not Easy One.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):31-40.
Similar books and articles
Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach.Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
Phenomenal Concepts as Bare Recognitional Concepts: Harder to Debunk Than You Thought, …but Still Possible.Emmett L. Holman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):807-827.
Phenomenal Concepts, Color Experience, and Mary's Puzzle.Diana I. Pérez - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):113-133.
Review of Torin Alter, Sven Walter , Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).
Added to index2009-01-29
Total downloads1,034 ( #661 of 2,169,707 )
Recent downloads (6 months)47 ( #5,088 of 2,169,707 )
How can I increase my downloads?