Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem

Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528 (1999)
Abstract
This paper was chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As he puts it, “zombies” are metaphysically possible. I attempt to show that this argument is refuted by considering an analogous argument in the mouth of a zombie. The conclusion of this argument is false so one of the premises is false. I argue at length that this shows that the original conceivability argument also has a false premise and so is invalid.
Keywords Conceivability  Metaphysics  Mind-body problem  Possibility  Chalmers, D  Jackson, F  Physicalism  Dualism  Consciousness
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DOI 10.2307/2998286
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There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.

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