Deriving the Norm of Assertion


Authors
Brian Ball
Oxford University
Abstract
Frank Hindriks has attempted to derive a variant of Timothy Williamson’s knowledge rule for assertion on the basis of a more fundamental belief expression analysis of that speech act. I show that his attempted derivation involves a crucial equivocation between two senses of ‘must,’ and therefore fails. I suggest two possible repairs; but I argue that even if they are successful, we should prefer Williamson’s fully general knowledge rule to Hindriks’s restricted moral norm.
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DOI 10.5840/jpr201472411
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The Knowledge Rule and the Action Rule.Brian Ball - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):552-574.

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