Synthese 167 (3):311 - 320 (2009)

Authors
Katalin Balog
Rutgers University - Newark
Abstract
Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper he characterizes non-conceptual content in a particular way and argues that it is plausible that it plays an explanatory role in accounting for certain auditory and visual phenomena. So he thinks that there is reason to believe that there is non-conceptual content. On the other hand, Fodor thinks that non-conceptual content has a limited role. It occurs only in the very early stages of perceptual processing prior to conscious awareness. My paper is examines Fodor’s characterization of non-conceptual content and his claims for its explanatory importance. I also discuss if Fodor has made a case for limiting non-conceptual content to non-conscious, sub-personal mental states.
Keywords non-conceptual content  unconscious mental states  iconic representation  perceptual representation
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9585-x
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.

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Citations of this work BETA

Analog Representation and the Parts Principle.John Kulvicki - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1):165-180.
Experiencia perceptual y sustento epistémico.José Luís Falguera & Santiago Peleteiro - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 39 (2):7-32.

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