Knockdown Arguments

Erkenntnis 79 (S3):525-543 (2014)
Authors
Nathan Ballantyne
Fordham University
Abstract
David Lewis and Peter van Inwagen have claimed that there are no “knockdown” arguments in philosophy. Their claim appears to be at odds with common philosophical practice: philosophers often write as though their conclusions are established or proven and that the considerations offered for these conclusions are decisive. In this paper, I examine some questions raised by Lewis’s and van Inwagen’s contention. What are knockdown arguments? Are there any in philosophy? If not, why not? These questions concern the nature of the philosophical enterprise and our answers have implications for the limits on the attitudes of informed, rational thinkers.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9506-8
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
Epistemic Operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
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Citations of this work BETA

Debunking Biased Thinkers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):141--162.
How Valuable Could a Material Object Be?Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):332-343.
Counterfactual Philosophers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):368-387.
On Knockdown Arguments.John A. Keller - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1205-1215.
Epistemic Trespassing.Nathan Ballantyne - forthcoming - Mind:fzx042.

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