Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and Unactualized Possibilities

Metaphysica 15 (1):209–217 (2014)
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Abstract

It is a commonsense thesis that unactualized possibilities are not parts of actuality. To keep his modal realism in line with this thesis, David Lewis employed his indexical account of the term “actual.” I argue that the addition of counterpart theory to Lewis’s modal realism undermines his strategy for respecting the commonsense thesis. The case made here also reveals a problem for Lewis’s attempt to avoid haecceitism.

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Citations of this work

Haecceitism.Sam Cowling - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Recombining non-qualitative reality.Sam Cowling - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2273-2295.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic.David Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.

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