Non-uniqueness as a non-problem

Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):63-84 (1998)

Abstract
A response is given here to Benacerraf's (1965) non-uniqueness (or multiple-reductions) objection to mathematical platonism. It is argued that non-uniqueness is simply not a problem for platonism; more specifically, it is argued that platonists can simply embrace non-uniqueness—i.e., that one can endorse the thesis that our mathematical theories truly describe collections of abstract mathematical objects while rejecting the thesis that such theories truly describe unique collections of such objects. I also argue that part of the motivation for this stance is that it dovetails with the correct response to Benacerraf's other objection to platonism, i.e., his (1973) epistemological objection.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/6.1.63
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References found in this work BETA

Mathematical Truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
What Numbers Could Not Be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology.Stewart Shapiro - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):467-475.
Models and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1980 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3):464-482.

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Citations of this work BETA

Mathematical and Moral Disagreement.Silvia Jonas - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
Mathematical Platonism Meets Ontological Pluralism?Matteo Plebani - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
Non‐Factualism Versus Nominalism.Matteo Plebani - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).

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