Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):63-84 (1998)

Abstract
A response is given here to Benacerraf's (1965) non-uniqueness (or multiple-reductions) objection to mathematical platonism. It is argued that non-uniqueness is simply not a problem for platonism; more specifically, it is argued that platonists can simply embrace non-uniqueness—i.e., that one can endorse the thesis that our mathematical theories truly describe collections of abstract mathematical objects while rejecting the thesis that such theories truly describe unique collections of such objects. I also argue that part of the motivation for this stance is that it dovetails with the correct response to Benacerraf's other objection to platonism, i.e., his (1973) epistemological objection.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/6.1.63
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References found in this work BETA

Mathematical Truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
What Numbers Could Not Be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology.Stewart Shapiro - 1997 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Models and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1980 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3):464-482.
Informal Rigour and Completeness Proofs.Georg Kreisel - 1967 - In Imre Lakatos (ed.), Problems in the Philosophy of Mathematics. North-Holland. pp. 138--157.

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Mathematical and Moral Disagreement.Silvia Jonas - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):302-327.

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