Abstract
[Robert Stalnaker] Saul Kripke made a convincing case that there are necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori as well as contingent truths that are knowable a priori. A number of philosophers have used a two-dimensional model semantic apparatus to represent and clarify the phenomena that Kripke pointed to. According to this analysis, statements have truth-conditions in two different ways depending on whether one considers a possible world 'as actual' or 'as counterfactual' in determining the truth-value of the statement relative to that possible world. There are no necessary a posteriori or contingent a priori propositions: rather, contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori statements are statements that are necessary when evaluated one way, and contingent when evaluated the other way. This paper distinguishes two ways that the two-dimensional framework can be interpreted, and argues that one of them gives the better account of what it means to 'consider a world as actual', but that it provides no support for any notion of purely conceptual a priori truth. /// [Thomas Baldwin] Two-dimensional possible world semantic theory suggests that Kripke's examples of the necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori should be handled by interpreting names as implicitly indexical. Like Stalnaker, I reject this account of names and accept that Kripke's examples have to be accommodated within a metasemantic theory. But whereas Stalnaker maintains that a metasemantic approach undermines the conception of a priori truth, I argue that it offers the opportunity to develop a conception of the a priori aspect of stipulations, conceived as linguistic performances. The resulting position accommodates Kripke's examples in a way which is both intrinsically plausible and fits with Kripke's actual discussion of them
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-8349.00084
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 52,919
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Afterthoughts.David Kaplan - 1989 - In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 565-614.
Dthat.David Kaplan - 1978 - In Peter Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics. Academic Press. pp. 221--243.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth.William H. Hanson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):437-459.
Reference, Contingency, and the Two-Dimensional Framework.Martin Davies - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):83-131.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Contingent a Priori: Kripke's Two Types of Examples.Heimir Geirsson - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):195 – 205.
Proper Names, Contingency A Priori and Necessity A Posteriori.Chen Bo - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2):119 - 138.
Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.
A Priori and a Posteriori.Jason S. Baehr - 2003 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
107 ( #87,014 of 2,343,525 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #332,879 of 2,343,525 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes