Richness and rationality: causal decision theory and the WAR argument

Synthese 195 (1):259-267 (2018)
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Abstract

Causal decision theory is one of our most prominent theories of rational choice and the “why ain’cha rich?” argument is one of the most prominent objections to this theory. According to WAR, CDT is not an adequate theory of rational choice because it leads agents to make decisions that foreseeably leave them less well off than agents that decide in some other manner. Some philosophers take WAR to decisively undermine CDT. On the other hand, others take WAR to fail to resolve the debate over CDT’s adequacy. In this paper, I will defend this second view: WAR does not resolve the debate at hand but instead leads to deadlock. Then, in the second half of this paper, I will show that this deadlock is not broken by a recent variant on WAR due to Caspar Hare and Brian Hedden. Not only does this result have implications for the debate over CDT’s adequacy but this discussion also casts light on the broader success/rationality link.

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Adam Bales
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Causal decision theory.Paul Weirich - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Escaping the Cycle.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2022 - Mind 131 (521):99-127.
A Dutch book for CDT thirders.Theodore Korzukhin - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11925-11941.

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References found in this work

Evidence, Decision and Causality.Arif Ahmed - 2014 - United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility.Allan Gibbard & William L. Harper - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 125-162.

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