Restricted Diachronic Composition, Immanent Causality, and Objecthood: A Reply to Hudson

Philosophical Papers 32 (1):23-30 (2003)
Composition, persistence, vagueness, and more constitute an interconnected network of problems. My criticism of Hud Hudson's provocative claims made in a recent paper (Hudson 2002) was focused almost exclusively on the issue of diachronic composition (Balashov 2003). Hudson's response (2003) has highlighted the dangers of such isolationism. But I want to hold to my strategy to the end. Part of the reason is to evade the appalling responsibility of presenting a full-blown theory of all the above phenomena; I must confess that I do not have such a theory. At the same time, I contend that diachronic composition can be profitably carved out from the medley of the surrounding issues more or less at the joints provided by nature itself. And I do subscribe to some sort of realism about the joints of nature.
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DOI 10.1080/05568640309485111
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References found in this work BETA
Dean W. Zimmerman (1997). Immanent Causation. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):433-471.

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Citations of this work BETA
Cody Gilmore (2006). Where in the Relativistic World Are We? Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):199–236.
Joshua D. K. Brown (forthcoming). Natural Objects. Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-18.

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