Thinking About Consciousness [Book Review]

Mind 113 (452):774-778 (2004)
Abstract
Papineau in his book provides a detailed defense of physicalism via what has recently been dubbed the “phenomenal concept strategy”. I share his enthusiasm for this approach. But I disagree with his account of how a physicalist should respond to the conceivability arguments. Also I argue that his appeal to teleosemantics in explaining mental quotation is more like a promissory note than an actual theory.
Keywords physicalism  conceivability arguments  teleosemantics
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DOI 10.1093/mind/113.452.774
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