There are no phenomenal concepts

Mind 118 (472):935-962 (2009)
Abstract
It has long been widely agreed that some concepts can be possessed only by those who have undergone a certain type of phenomenal experience. Orthodoxy among contemporary philosophers of mind has it that these phenomenal concepts provide the key to understanding many disputes between physicalists and their opponents, and in particular offer an explanation of Mary’s predicament in the situation exploited by Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. I reject the orthodox view; I deny that there are phenomenal concepts. My arguments exploit the sort of considerations that are typically used to motivate externalism about mental content. Although physicalists often appeal to phenomenal concepts to defend their view against the knowledge argument, I argue that this is a mistake. The knowledge argument depends on phenomenal concepts; if there are no phenomenal concepts, then the knowledge argument fails
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzp134
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References found in this work BETA
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (December):697-720.

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Citations of this work BETA
Practical Modes of Presentation.Ephraim Glick - 2013 - Noûs 49 (3):538-559.
Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.

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