Twin-earth externalism and concept possession

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):457-472 (2007)
Abstract
It is widely believed that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments show that the contents of a person's thoughts fail to supervene on her intrinsic properties. Several recent philosophers have made the further claim that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments produce metaphysically necessary conditions for the possession of certain concepts. I argue that the latter view is false, and produce counterexamples to several proposed conditions. My thesis is of particular interest because it undermines some attempts to show that externalism is incompatible with privileged access.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400701572220
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References found in this work BETA
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Mental Content.Colin McGinn - 1989 - Blackwell.
Reference and Definite Descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.

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Citations of this work BETA
There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.

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