The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis)

Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):1-24 (2009)
Abstract
It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision-making processes—for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will—except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questions—namely, the conceptual-analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility—are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human beings.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2009.tb00129.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,162
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Philosophical Papers.J. L. Austin - 1961 - Oxford University Press.
Freedom Within Reason.Wolf Susan - 1990 - Oxford University Press.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Alfred Mele's Metaphysical Freedom?E. J. Coffman & Ted A. Warfield - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.
Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism.Gary Watson - 1999 - Journal of Ethics 3 (4):351-365.
Responsibility and Control.Paul Russell - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32:587-606.
Is Hard Determinism a Form of Compatibilism?Jeremy Randel Koons - 2002 - Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.
Compatibilism: The Argument From Shallowness.Saul Smilansky - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):257-82.
The Revisionist Turn: A Brief History of Recent Work on Free Will.Manuel Vargas - 2010 - In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-05-01

Total downloads

190 ( #22,178 of 2,152,240 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

12 ( #44,981 of 2,152,240 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums