Verbal Disagreements and Philosophical Scepticism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):752-765 (2016)
Abstract
ABSTRACTMany philosophers have suggested that disagreement is good grounds for scepticism. One response says that disagreement-motivated scepticism can be mitigated to some extent by the thesis that philosophical disputes are often verbal, not genuine. I consider the implications of this anti-sceptical strategy, arguing that it trades one kind of scepticism for others. I conclude with suggestions for further investigation of the epistemic significance of the nature of philosophical disagreement.
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2016.1149200
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