Synthese 168 (1):1 - 21 (2009)

Authors
Mark Balaguer
California State University, Los Angeles
Abstract
This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from this quarter—to doubt that we are libertarian free. In particular, the paper responds to various arguments for neural and psychological determinism, arguments based on the work of people like Honderich, Tegmark, Libet, Velmans, Wegner, and Festinger.
Keywords Determinism  Libertarianism  Free will  Neural determinism  Psychological determinism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9459-2
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References found in this work BETA

The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
The Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics.Simon Kochen & E. P. Specker - 1967 - Journal of Mathematics and Mechanics 17:59--87.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Free Will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Questions for a Science of Moral Responsibility.Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):381-394.
Do the Results of Divine Actions Have Preceding Causes?Daniel von Wachter - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):347-367.
Neurowetenschappen En de Illusie van Vrije Wil.Lieke Asma - 2019 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 111 (3):339-358.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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