Indeterminacy and the mind-body problem

Katalin Balog
Rutgers University - Newark
This paper is an examination of the mind’s relationship to the physical world, in light of the dialectic between anti-physicalist arguments and physicalist responses. Having developed a master argument against the anti-physicalist, I then notice that there is a puzzling symmetry between dualist attacks on physicalism and physicalist replies. Each position can be developed in a way to defend itself from attacks from the other position. My suggestion is that the reason for the seeming unresolvability of the problem is that there is no determinate fact about the metaphysical grounding of mind.
Keywords Consciousness  Conceivability  Mind-body problem  Dualism  Physicalism  Conceivability arguments  Explanatory gap  Hard Problem of Consciousness
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New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.

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