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Abstract
We introduce a distinction, unnoticed in the literature, between four varieties of objective Bayesianism. What we call ' strong objective Bayesianism' is characterized by two claims, that all scientific inference is 'logical' and that, given the same background information two agents will ascribe a unique probability to their priors. We think that neither of these claims can be sustained; in this sense, they are 'dogmatic'. The first fails to recognize that some scientific inference, in particular that concerning evidential relations, is not (in the appropriate sense) logical, the second fails to provide a non-question-begging account of 'same background information'. We urge that a suitably objective Bayesian account of scientific inference does not require either of the claims. Finally, we argue that Bayesianism needs to be fine-grained in the same way that Bayesians fine-grain their beliefs
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DOI 10.1080/02698590903467119
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References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
From a Logical Point of View.W. V. O. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.

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Citations of this work BETA

Does Science Presuppose Naturalism ?Yonatan I. Fishman & Maarten Boudry - 2013 - Science & Education 22 (5):921-949.
Invariant Equivocation.Jürgen Landes & George Masterton - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):141-167.

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