Public Affairs Quarterly 24 (1):65-78 (2010)

Gary Bartlett
Central Washington University
I sketch a non-rights-based grounding for the impermissibility of spanking. Even if children have no right against being spanked, I contend that spanking can be seen to be impermissible without appeal to such a right. My approach is primarily consequentialist but also has affinities with virtue ethics, for it emphasizes the moral importance of avoiding bad habits in one’s behavior toward one’s children.
Keywords spanking  harm  escalation  children
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