Appearances and Impressions

Phronesis 37 (3):283-313 (1992)
Pyrrhonian sceptics claim, notoriously, to assent to the appearances without making claims about how things are. To see whether this is coherent we need to consider the philosophical history of ‘appearance’(phainesthai)-talk, and the closely related concept of an impression (phantasia). This history suggests that the sceptics resemble Plato in lacking the ‘non-epistemic’ or ‘non-doxastic’ conception of appearance developed by Aristotle and the Stoics. What is distinctive about the Pyrrhonian sceptic is simply that the degree of doxastic commitment involved in his assent to an impression is asymptotally low.
Keywords scepticism  appearance  impression  phantasia
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DOI 10.1163/156852892321052533
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Jessica Moss (2014). Plato's Appearance‐Assent Account of Belief. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):213-238.

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