Anti-realism and speaker knowledge

Synthese 106 (2):139 - 166 (1996)
Dummettian anti-realism repudiates the realist's notion of verification-transcendent truth. Perhaps the most crucial element in the Dummettian attack on realist truth is the critique of so-called realist semantics, which assigns verification-transcendent truth-conditions as the meanings of (some) sentences. The Dummettian critique charges that realist semantics cannot serve as an adequate theory of meaning for a natural language, and that, consequently, the realist conception of truth must be rejected as well. In arguing for this, Dummett and his followers have appealed to a certain conception of linguistic knowledge. This paper examines closely the appeal to speakers' knowledge of linguistic meaning, its force and limitations.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413698
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1978 - Harvard University Press.

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Semantic Eliminativism and the Theory-Theory of Linguistic Understanding.Dorit Bar-On - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):159-199.

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