Authors
Anouk Barberousse
Université Paris-Sorbonne
Abstract
Were Maxwell and Boltzmann irrational to develop statistical mechanics whereas it was empirically refuted by the specific heats problem? My analysis of this historical episode departs from the current proposals about belief change. I first give a detailed description of Maxwell's and Boltzmann's epistemic states in the years they were working on statistical mechanics and then make some methodological proposals in epistemology that would account for the complexity of this case.
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References found in this work BETA

``A Plethora of Epistemological Theories&Quot.John Pollock - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 93-115.

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