A Note on a Remark of Evans

Polish Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):7-15 (2016)
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Abstract

In his seminal paper, ‘Can There Be Vague Objects?’ (1978), Gareth Evans advanced an argument purporting to prove that the idea of indeterminate identity is incoherent. Aware that his argument was incomplete as it stands, Evans added a remark at the end of his paper, in which he explained how the original argument needed to be modified to arrive at an explicit contradiction. This paper aims to develop a modified version of Evans’ original argument, which I argue is more promising than the modification that Evans proposed in his remark. Last, a structurally similar argument against the idea of indeterminate existence is presented.

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Wolfgang Barz
Goethe University Frankfurt

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References found in this work

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.
Can there be vague objects?Gareth Evans - 1978 - Analysis 38 (4):208.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
Vagueness and Contradiction.Roy A. Sorensen - 2001 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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