Authors
Brian C. Barnett
State University of New York (SUNY)
Abstract
A common view among nontheists combines the de jure objection that theism is epistemically unacceptable with agnosticism about the de facto objection that theism is false. Following Plantinga, we can call this a “proper” de jure objection—a de jure objection that does not depend on any de facto objection. In his Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga has produced a general argument against all proper de jure objections. Here I first show that this argument is logically fallacious (it makes subtle probabilistic fallacies disguised by scope ambiguities), and proceed to lay the groundwork for the construction of actual proper de jure objections.
Keywords epistemic  probability  theism  Plantinga
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References found in this work BETA

Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - Oxford University Press USA.
Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 1975 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 47.
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.

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