Analysis 77 (3):479-487 (2017)

Authors
Dan Baras
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract
Many philosophers believe that when a theory is committed to an apparently unexplainable massive correlation, that fact counts significantly against the theory. Philosophical theories that imply that we have knowledge of non-causal mind-independent facts are especially prone to this objection. Prominent examples of such theories are mathematical Platonism, robust normative realism and modal realism. It is sometimes thought that theists can easily respond to this sort of challenge and that theism therefore has an epistemic advantage over atheism. In this paper, I will argue that, contrary to widespread thought, some versions of theism only push the challenge one step further and thus are in no better position than atheism.
Keywords Platonism  Reliability Challenge  Benacerraf-Field Argument  Theism
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anx089
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References found in this work BETA

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality.Hartry Field - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.
Mathematical Truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
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Citations of this work BETA

Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
How God Knows Counterfactuals of Freedom.Justin Mooney - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (2):220-229.
How Does God Know That 2 + 2 = 4?Andrew Brenner - forthcoming - Religious Studies:1-16.

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