Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):241-254 (2007)
AbstractThe phenomenon of base-rate neglect has elicited much debate. One arena of debate concerns how people make judgments under conditions of uncertainty. Another more controversial arena concerns human rationality. In this target article, we attempt to unpack the perspectives in the literature on both kinds of issues and evaluate their ability to explain existing data and their conceptual coherence. From this evaluation we conclude that the best account of the data should be framed in terms of a dual-process model of judgment, which attributes base-rate neglect to associative judgment strategies that fail to adequately represent the set structure of the problem. Base-rate neglect is reduced when problems are presented in a format that affords accurate representation in terms of nested sets of individuals
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References found in this work
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The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information.George A. Miller - 1956 - Psychological Review 63 (2):81-97.