Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199 (2010)
Abstract
I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, since, in their context of assertion V was bivalent. This theory requires a theory of assertion that is a form of cognitive expressivism
Keywords faultless disagreement  expressivism  objective truth  bivalence  truth-aptness  assertion
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00283.x
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Making Sense of Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.

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Citations of this work BETA
Absolutely Tasty: An Examination of Predicates of Personal Taste and Faultless Disagreement.Jeremy Wyatt - forthcoming - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-29.

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